The accession of ten new member states in May 2004 profoundly and irrevocably altered the European Union. The European Union expanded to encompass almost 400 million people in twenty-five member states. It has been speculated that, as a consequence of this expansion, mobile telecommunication operators will change their investment strategies to encompass these new member states. In this paper we establish second-and thirdgeneration licence ownership as well as the number of subscribers controlled by each licensee. Multiple licence owners are then categorised by their presence in, and stated intent towards, accession countries, demonstrating in the process the range of expansion and consolidation strategic options that are available.
Introduction
On 1 May 2004, the European Union (EU) witnessed its single largest expansion when ten countries joined. The accession of these ten countries -Cyprus (South), Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia -has irrevocably changed the EU [1] . In terms of sheer geographic size, for example, the surface area of the EU increased by more than 700,000 sq km, allowing Berlin to claim that it is no longer located on the edge of Europe but at its heart, while another 74 million people were added to its population.
Prior to the discussions on accession, there was a clear, albeit diminishing, divide between Eastern and Western Europe. While many industrial companies from the West had crossed into Eastern Europe, they had by no stretch of the imagination taken it over, despite Eastern Europe's reputation for shoddy products. This was certainly the case where telecommunications was concerned, an industry traditionally treated as a 'national champion' and hence one where governments were somewhat ambivalent about stake-building by foreigners. On the one hand, they were less than keen on ceding control over the industry to foreigners, while on the other their incumbent operators badly needed new investment which was not available domestically. Those countries negotiating for accession were also well aware that they would be bound by the rules of the EU, which would restrict their ability to keep out 'foreign' companies that originated elsewhere in the EU (although some existing EU member states were quite practised at doing so). Equally, companies that had stayed out of Eastern Europe on principle would now see their way clear to cross into post-accession member states.
The purpose of this paper is to explore two particular issues in the context of the mobile telecommunications market: Firstly, whether as a consequence of EU expansion, the accession countries will indeed be the recipients of inward investment from those companies that have, until now, largely ignored them; and secondly, whether those companies already active in the accession countries will seek to reinforce their existing positions.
To this end, the paper is structured as follows. In the main section that follows, the ownership of mobile communication licences across the enlarged EU will be described. In addition, the geographical footprint of operators will be established, with a distinction being made between those operators that have invested in the accession countries and those that have not. In the second main section the focus shifts onto the accession countries, with the analysis being driven by the issues outlined above. Conclusions will be drawn in the final section.
Mobile communication licence ownership across the enlarged EU
As the heart of the analysis of the implications of EU expansion on the strategies of mobile telecommunications companies is Table 1 . This table depicts second generation (2G) and third generation (3G) mobile licence ownership across the twenty-five countries that are now member states of the EU. This table builds on Whalley & Curwen (2003) in four ways. Firstly, the table differentiates between the two bandwidths used for what is generically called GSM, namely GSM 900 and 1800 (PCNs). Secondly, the table identifies when each mobile service was launched. Thirdly, the table details the number of subscribers that each company had at the end of December 2003. Finally, the table also identifies the fixed-wire incumbent operator (the PTO) for each country. Where an operator provides both GSM (900 MHz band) and PCNs (1800 MHz band), the subscriber data are generally provided for both services together in the GSM column. Subscriber data often differ depending upon the source, but such differences are not statistically significant in the context of EU countries. There is, however, some controversy over the counting of 'inactive' customers. For example, Vodafone and Orange in the UK delete customers who have been inactive (making, say, no outgoing calls and receiving fewer than four incoming calls per month) for three months, whereas some operators only do so after a year of inactivity and some not at all. 3 The term 'launch' in the context of UMTS can mean many things, but usually refers to the launch of a service for corporate customers via PC cards inserted in laptops. A consumer service via handsets usually follows months later. The subscriber numbers are for fully launched services, and are unlikely to be wholly accurate.
Extending Whalley & Curwen (2003) is advantageous in several ways. By detailing the number of subscribers that a company has in each country, the table begins to differentiate between a simple presence in a country where the company is not a significant player and a presence where the company is actually (one of) the largest in the market in terms of number of subscribers. By combining the service launch date and the number of subscribers, the table also provides an impression as to how fast the market is growing and how successful the mobile operator has been in gaining subscribers. Since the table identifies the fixed-wire incumbent for each country as well as the mobile operators, it is also possible to investigate whether or not the incumbent owns the largest mobile operator in each country. Such common ownership is important, as it will contribute, to a greater or lesser extent, to the competitiveness and openness of the mobile market.
Using Table 1 as our starting point, it is possible to make a series of preliminary observations about the mobile market of the enlarged EU in general and the mobile markets of accession countries in particular. Firstly, 2G mobile communication licences have been issued in all member states. Although eighty licences have been issued, the number of licences issued in each member state varies between two and five. Cyprus (South), Luxembourg, Malta and Slovakia have issued only two 2G licences, while the Netherlands uniquely has issued five. The most common number of 2G licences to be issued is three; thirteen member states have issued three licences compared to seven that have issued four licences.
In contrast, not all EU member states have issued 3G licences. At the time of writing, June 2004, twenty-two (probably) [2] of the twenty-five EU member states have issued 3G licences. Perhaps surprisingly, more 3G licences than 2G licences have been put on offer, but because not all of the licences on offer were actually awarded the number of operational 3G licences is currently less than the number of operational 2G licences. There are eighty operational 2G licences but of the eighty-seven [2] 3G licences on offer only seventy-eight were taken up [3, 4] . This is somewhat surprising as many governments indicated their desire to use the 3G licensing process as a way to increase the number of companies, and therefore the amount of competition, in the market.
Only a minority of member states witnessed the launch of 3G services prior to the end of 2003, as shown in Table 1 . By that point, only eleven mobile operators across the EU had begun to offer 3G services, and only seven were willing/able to announce the number of subscribers (see Table 1 , footnote 3) although by June 2004 the number of (so-called) launches involved thirty-one operators in fourteen member states. More than half of the 646,400 3G subscribers on 31 December 2003 were to be found in Italy, with the UK accounting for another 215,000. In both countries, the operator concerned trades under the same brand, namely '3', although ownership of the brand is not identical in every country where it has launched. It is notable that '3', or perhaps more accurately its main owner Hutchison Whampoa, accounted for five of the eleven launches during 2003, a phenomenon that was clearly related to its lack of 2G licences.
Secondly, across the enlarged EU, the incumbent fixed line operator owns the largest mobile operator in nineteen member states: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus (South), Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. This observation can also be phrased more informatively in a slightly different fashion; that is, in just two of the fifteen 'old' member states of the EU the incumbent operator does not own the largest mobile operator. The exceptions are Ireland and the UK. In the case of Ireland, Eircom, the incumbent fixed operator, divested its mobile subsidiary, Eircell, in May 2001, and Vodafone subsequently acquired Eircell for €4.5bn in December 2001. BT also divested its mobile arm, mmO 2 . In November 2001, BT spun off mmO 2 in order to ease the financial problems that it was facing in the aftermath of acquiring 3G licences and buying out its partners in its British, Irish, Dutch and German mobile businesses. Moreover, mmO 2 is not the largest mobile operator in the UK and has not been for many years. This accolade has alternated between Orange, a subsidiary of France Télécom, and Vodafone. As of December 2003, all four GSM network operators had at least 13 million subscribers and only 897,000 subscribers separated the largest company, Vodafone, from the smallest, mmO 2 . As Table 1 shows, no other member state has anything like such equality between so many operators.
This leaves four member states, all accession countries, where the incumbent fixed operator does not own the largest mobile operator. In all of these -Lithuania, Malta, Poland and Slovakiathe largest mobile operator is partially owned by foreign investors. In Lithuania, the incumbent fixed operator does not own a stake in any mobile operator, while in the case of the other three countries the incumbent owns a stake in the second-largest mobile operator.
Related to the above is a third observation, namely, that those mobile operators with multiple licences across the EU are usually the second-or third-largest operators in the market. Through combining the subscriber information contained in Table 1 with Whalley & Curwen (2003) which identified multiple licence ownership across Europe, it is possible to determine the market position of operators in EU member states. With two exceptions -Tele2 and mmO 2 -each company identified below is the largest operator in its home market. Tele2 is the second-largest operator in Sweden after TeliaSonera while mmO 2 is the smallest of the four second-generation network operators in the UK. Tele2 is also exceptional in another way: it is the only company identified in Table 2 that is not the largest company in any of the markets where it operates. If we focus on those mobile operators that are the largest operators in a foreign country, then a common trait is that those markets where they are the largest are comparatively small. For example, TeliaSonera is the largest mobile operator in the three Baltic States but these are among the smallest of all the EU markets. Orange (in Luxembourg) and Vodafone are also the largest operators in relatively small markets. Vodafone (along with TDC until March 2004) has a (minority) stake in the largest-operator in the modestly sized Belgian market and a fully-owned operation in Ireland and Malta. Deutsche Telekom is the largest mobile operator in Hungary and Poland, but whereas the Hungarian market is relatively modest in size with 7.2 million subscribers, the Polish market, with more than 17 million subscribers, is the sixth-largest in the EU. In this respect, therefore, Deutsche Telekom is unique among the mobile operators identified in Table 2 , and is all the more remarkable when the new-entrant status of PTC, Deutsche Telekom's Polish business, is taken into account.
Fourthly, drawing on the subscriber information contained in Table 1 , it is possible to calculate the percentage of the mobile market controlled by the largest (two) mobile operator(s) as of 31 December 2003. As we can observe from Table 3 below, it is normally the case that the largest mobile operator controls at least 40 percent of the market. Often, the percentage controlled by the largest operator is far greater. For example, in Spain, Telefónica accounted for 52.8 percent of all mobile subscribers. However, in three countries -The Netherlands, Poland and the UK -the largest mobile operator controlled less than 40 percent of all subscribers. For both the Netherlands and Poland, the largest mobile operator controlled at least 35 percent of the market, but in the case of the UK the market share of the largest operator was just 25.8 percent. If the calculation is extended to include the second largest mobile operator in each market, then in most member states the mobile market is, to all intents and purposes, a duopoly. The two largest mobile operators normally control over 70 percent of the market between them, with the only exceptions being the three countries identified above. However, with 68.8 percent of the Polish market being controlled by the two largest mobile operators it could be argued that the two exceptions that prove the rule are The Netherlands and the UK.
Where three or more mobile operators have been licensed, a considerable gap often exists between the number of mobile subscribers controlled by the second-largest operator and the number of subscribers controlled by the third-largest mobile operator. In seven member states, the subscriber base of the third-largest mobile operator is approximately half the size of the secondlargest mobile operator. For example, in Sweden, Tele2 is the second-largest mobile operator with 3,310,000 subscribers at the end of December 2003, while Vodafone is the third-largest operator with just 1,422,000 subscribers. In other words, Vodafone has just 43 percent of the number of subscribers that Tele2 does. The other member states where the third-largest operator is approximately half the size of the second-largest are the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Hungary, Italy and the Netherlands.
In addition to the aforementioned seven countries, it is possible to identify another three member states where the third-largest mobile operator has considerably fewer than half of the subscriber base of the second-largest. In Germany, E-Plus has around one-third of the subscribers of the second-largest operator, Vodafone. In Ireland and Slovenia, the size difference is even larger; in Slovenia the third-largest mobile operator has just 11 percent of the subscribers of the secondlargest, while in the case of Ireland the figure is 13 percent.
Fifthly, in the majority of EU member states the most recent mobile operator to launch its service is also the one with the fewest subscribers. Although this is true for fifteen EU member states, it is surprising that only four of these can be found among the accession countries. In other words, the date when a mobile operator launched its services is more important in the EU15 than in the accession countries. For five member states -Austria, Finland, Latvia, Slovenia and the UKthe gap between the smallest and the next-largest operator is less than one million subscribers, while for the remaining ten countries the gap is greater, sometimes considerably greater, than one million. For example, in Italy there is a gap of almost ten million subscribers between Wind, the last of the three 2G operators to launch its service, and Vodafone, the second-largest operator in the market. Gaps of more than two million subscribers can also be found in France (8.1 million subscribers), Germany (2.6 million), the Czech Republic (2.3 million) and Greece (2.1 million). In Belgium, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal and Spain the gap is less than one million subscribers.
Mobile communication markets in accession countries
The first issue to address at this point is the extent to which mobile operators are EU-centric in respect of their geographical footprints, distinguishing between operators with a heavy presence in the former EU and those with a presence in the accession countries. Table 4 below is drawn up so as to include those operators with licences in at least two accession countries. This is a modest enough total, but reflects the fact that only one operator, Vodafone, is present in more than four of the ten. Even here, however, there is a need to distinguish carefully between operators with licences and those companies operating under other arrangements. For example, it is possible for an operator to act as a mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) which technically requires it to own its own switches and sell under its own brand, although there are also less rigorous ways to operate such as an enhanced service provider or simply as a reseller of another operator's branded service. The primary advocate of the MVNO approach is Tele2 although as Table 3 shows, it prefers direct investment in networks in accession countries while operating as an MVNO in more established markets. For its part, Vodafone prefers to negotiate Partner Agreements, involving no direct stake, whereby the network in question is usually re-branded with the original operator's name hyphenated to that of Vodafone. By this means Vodafone enjoys brand recognition without needing to lay out huge sums of money, and is able to introduce its Vodafone live! portal with associated roaming benefits, while the network owner enjoys improved subscriber numbers and reduced churn because the Vodafone name is more attractive than its own. In practice, Vodafone owns stakes in only three accession countries, so the operator with the greatest presence is in fact Deutsche Telekom subsidiary T-Mobile. This is unsurprising since the geographical position of Germany clearly lends itself to investment in countries close to its borders, many of which are accession countries (with possibly more to come). This is an important point because it is immediately noticeable that three of the big five EU incumbent mobile operators, mmO 2 , Telecom Italia Mobile (TIM) and Telefónica Móviles do not appear in Table 4 . For the latter in particular, this is ultimately a question of history, culture and language. Telefónica Móviles (and/or occasionally its parent) operates in ten overseas countries, of which nine are to be found in Latin America; the only exception is Morocco, its immediate southern neighbour. In other words, apart from some toying with 3G licences that has so far resulted in nothing other than fairly substantial write-offs, the company has zero interest in the EU, let alone accession countries. This strategy, it must be said, has served it well so far. TIM, for its part, also has over five million proportionate subscribers [5] in Latin America, albeit in only three countries, the same number in which it operates elsewhere in the world. In practice, its presence in a single accession country, the Czech Republic, merely represents a tiny stake in the operator controlled by T-Mobile, and is the least significant of its six overseas holdings. As for mmO 2 (both before and after its divestment from what is now the BT Group), it has spent a period of retrenchment involving the shedding of minority interests such that it remains operational in only Germany, the Netherlands and the UK (plus the Isle of Man). Even so, it has to be said that it was never really interested in the accession countries, preferring to get involved in South-East Asia and North America.
It is also be useful for the purposes of clarification to examine briefly the operations of mobile companies in what used to be termed Eastern Europe since only some of its constituent countries have become accession countries. As of 31 December 2003, four EU incumbents had a significant presence involving investment in Eastern Europe, namely Telenor, OTE, T-Mobile and TeliaSonera. OTE, interestingly, currently has stakes in Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania and Serbia, so it has not profited, to put it mildly, from accession. TeliaSonera's accession stakes are in practice entirely in the Baltic countries, so its stakes to the east, in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Russia have also all missed the accession boat, at least for now. For its part, Telenor has eleven overseas interests but, interestingly, it is not focussed upon the Nordic/Baltic area being present in only Denmark and Norway, whereas it has stakes in Albania, Greece, Montenegro, Russia and the Ukraine in respect of which it also missed out on accession. TMobile accordingly stands out because it has stakes in four accession countries, of which three (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) generated more than two million proportionate subscribers as of 31 December 2003. In addition, it owns stakes in Croatia, Macedonia and Russia, so of its total of eleven overseas holdings the majority are EU-based (Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia and the UK) as a result of accession even if the USA comfortably generates the third-largest number of proportionate subscribers after Germany and the UK.
What the above suggests is that there is a useful distinction to be made between the Baltic and Eastern European aspects of accession -Cyprus (South) and Malta are of little significance because of their size and lack of potential for the entry of major operators. Taking the three Baltic accession countries as a whole, the six operators listed in Table 4 generate nine entries although that is somewhat distorted by the Partnership Agreements. In contrast, the five broadly Eastern European countries generate ten entries. This is not a significant difference, so it is worth asking whether it results from the companies sampled. To answer this, we can return to the data in Whalley & Curwen (2003) which encompass thirteen major European operators, and these reveal that increasing the sample size makes almost no difference when compared to Table 4 above. Of the ten accession countries, only two are affected at all by the inclusion of the additional seven operators, namely Hungary where Telenor has a substantial stake and the Czech Republic where TIM has a very small stake. It is also possible to establish whether any significance can be attributed to the fact that two Nordic countries -Iceland and Norway -are not members of the EU. In practice, Iceland is not significant since the only EU operator there is Vodafone via a Partnership Agreement, but in Norway we find (predictably) both Telenor and TeliaSonera (trading as NetCom GSM) as incumbents with Tele2 as a MVNO (although it has returned its 3G licence).
In summary, accordingly, the situation was as follows at the time of accession: Vodafone had invested in accession countries in the former Eastern Europe (Group A) but had been keen to extend its footprint to the Baltic accession countries (Group B) without investing heavily. T-Mobile had heavily invested in Group A but was wholly disinterested in Group B. Orange was less involved in Group B but equally indifferent to Group A. TDC was slightly interested in both, while both TeliaSonera and Tele2 were heavily invested in Group B while wholly disinterested in Group A. Curiously, Telenor (not in Table 4 ) was the only Nordic operator acting in a wholly non-Nordic manner where accession was concerned.
Expansion and consolidation
Given the aforementioned differences in the countries in which the mobile operators identified in Table 4 have chosen to invest prior to accession, an inevitable question to ask is whether the accession of new members states will encourage any changes in their strategic priorities.
If we begin with T-Mobile, then the strategic importance of the Eastern European countries to the company is clear for all to see. Indeed, the CEO Kai-Uwe Ricke, basking in predictions of massive cash inflows during 2004, stated in May 2004 that 'Taking into account the EU's enlargement towards the east, we are placing a special focus on this region'. It is possible to calculate the importance of this region to T-Mobile as at 31 December 2003 when it had in total 68.6 million proportionate subscribers. Of these, 26.3 million were in Germany and 43.9 million in total in the pre-accession EU. Accession transferred a further 7.7 million to that total, yielding 51.6 million in total in the post-accession EU. The rest were largely accounted for by the USA (12.8 million) and Russia (3.4 million) with Croatia and Macedonia adding 0.8 million between them. T-Mobile has a choice between moving into new countries and expanding into existing ones. In both cases, much depends upon existing shareholders and their willingness to sell. Faced with a cash offer above the market price many shareholders might be expected to succumb, but Deutsche Telekom's own shareholders are unlikely to sanction using up cash reserves to support a move into the likes of Belarus, Moldova and the Ukraine. Moreover, T-Mobile was not willing to fight for the 2G licence issued in Bulgaria in May 2004 -the stake in BTC which came with the licence was won by a private equity company in preference to Turk Telecom.
Hence, the probability is that T-Mobile will prefer to increase its existing stakes, which can be seen above in Table 5 . In some cases, the purchase of additional equity will consolidate its existing control over the operator while in other cases the purchase could allow T-Mobile to take control of the operator for the first time. T-Mobile is particularly keen to acquire the 51 per cent of PTC it does not own in Poland, if only to keep one step ahead of Vodafone in a country with a modest penetration ratio. It allegedly upped its offer to €1.3 billion in June 2004, having had a slightly lower offer rejected in September 2003. Thus, its existing stakes provide T-Mobile with ample incentives and opportunities to continue its Eastern European-focused investment strategy. However, one intriguing prospect lies in the Czech Republic where, despite its majority stake in an incumbent, T-Mobile is alleged to be interested in acquiring EuroTel Praha via a bid for parent Ceský Telecom. Presumably, if it did so it would be forced to dispose of its existing network which is almost the same size, but this would get around the problem of trying to obtain full ownership of T-Mobile CZ. As a final point, the existing geographical bias can be to continue when the location of the next wave of accession countries, which will of necessity largely be located within a broadly defined Eastern Europe, is taken into account.
Will any of the other mobile operators identified in Table 4 follow T-Mobile and respond to accession by increasing their geographical coverage? As shown in Table 4 , Vodafone is already present in all but three of the ten accession countries, so the scope for it to invest in more of these markets is actually quite limited. Of the three markets where Vodafone is not presently active, the most significant is the Czech Republic. Of the three 2G operators in the Czech Republic, twoCeský Mobil and EuroTel Praha -are potential acquisitions. The third operator, T-Mobile CZ, is majority owned by Deutsche Telekom, and thus unavailable unless, as noted above, T-Mobile is forced to sell it. In practice, EuroTel Praha can also be dismissed as a likely acquisition target of Vodafone since it is possibly being targeted by T-Mobile and, in any event, it is a subsidiary of the incumbent PTO which is most unlikely to want to be split off from it mobile operations. Ceský Mobile is owned by Telesystem International Wireless, which may be prepared to sell its 96.4 per cent stake if the price is sufficiently attractive. Having said this, it remains to be seen whether Vodafone's shareholders would be prepared to countenance the comparatively expensive acquisition of the smallest of the Czech Republic's three 2G operators. Given the present investment, and the 16 per cent market share of Ceský Mobile, a more attractive course of action could be to enter into a Network Partnership agreement.
The other two markets, Latvia and Slovakia, are comparatively small. As a consequence, it is more likely that Vodafone would enter these markets through the use of Network Partnership agreements rather than an equity investment. However, this assumes that the existing 2G operators would enter into such an agreement. So far as Latvia is concerned, this is highly unlikely given who owns the two existing operators -Baltkom is owned by Tele2 while LMT is jointly owned by the Latvian state (51 per cent) and TeliaSonera (49 per cent). It is inconceivable that either Tele2 or TeliaSonera would sign a Network Partnership agreement with Vodafone as this would expand the regional coverage of their main competitor in the Baltic States.
The situation in Slovakia is a little more complicated, not least because Vodafone's ability to enter this market is also dependent on the strategic priorities and intentions of Orange. Orange has only a limited exposure to the mobile markets of the ten accession countries, with a presence across the EU that is increasingly skewed in favour of Western Europe. Figure 1 over, where black signifies a country where Orange is either the majority or outright owner and yellow where it is a minority owner, vividly illustrates this situation.
Orange has made two accession country mobile investments; in Poland, where it is a minority shareholder in PKT Centertel, and Slovakia where it owns 63.9 per cent of Orange Slovensko, the largest operator. These two investments are, however, somewhat detached from the other investments that Orange has made. Their relative peripherality is further reinforced when subscriber numbers are taken into account; Poland and Slovakia account just for 7.4 per cent of the wider European subscriber base of Orange. Orange has also invested in Romania, a country that hopes to be among the next wave of accession countries, though when these subscribers are also included the three countries account for just 12.3 per cent of the European subscriber base. In contrast, France and the UK, which are the two largest mobile markets of Orange, account for 76.6 per cent of its European subscriber base. In other words, if Orange were to sell its stakes in Poland, Slovakia and Romania its subscriber base would not shrink by as much as one might expect. However, given that Orange is committed to consolidation based upon countries where it holds majority stakes and hence control, preferably in conjunction with a top two ranking, and that parent France Télécom's short-term need for cash has abated somewhat in recent months, a wholesale withdrawal from the former Eastern Europe no longer seems likely. Nevertheless, it is of interest to ask who might buy these stakes if they did become available. Vodafone would potentially be interested in the 63.9 per cent of Orange Slovensko owned by Orange, not least because this would complement its existing array of mobile businesses and could possibly act, at a later date, as a springboard for a move into the other Balkan states, but it is unlikely to happen. Not only are Vodafone's shareholders unlikely to be willing to support an acquisition that adds a comparatively small number of subscribers in a market where growth expectations are limited -Slovakia's population is only 5.4 million and 3.6 million already have a mobile phone -but there are attractive investments with more potential elsewhere. One such is Romania where Vodafone is already a minority shareholder in Connex -see Table 6 -and whose population is four times that of Slovakia. Telesystem International Wireless (TIW), holder of a 63.6 per cent stake, is currently (July 2004) buying all or part of the 14.4 per cent stake held by Deraso Holdings. Anything it declines will be offered to Vodafone. The potential of the market may be tempting for Vodafone, but even if TIW is willing to sell, it is going to demand a premium price. Outside of such an acquisition, Vodafone is unlikely to expand into new markets other than through Network Partnership agreements. What of the other companies identified in Table 4 ? For different reasons, neither TDC nor TeliaSonera are likely to expand their geographical footprint as a result of EU expansion. TDC has only two remaining investments in accession countries, in Bité in Lithuania and Polkomtel in Poland. During 2003, TDC sold its holdings in the Czech Republic and the Ukraine, so it does not appear to see the former Eastern Europe as other than providing opportunities for financial investments. In any event, any additional investments by TDC in accession countries can, for the foreseeable future, be ruled out until the uncertainty over its own future is resolved. In mid-2004, SBC Communications Inc. sold 32.1 per cent of the 41.6 per cent of TDC that it owned [5], but to financial institutions rather than to another telco. Pending the completion of this sale, TDC has stated that it will not enter into any negotiations regarding 'potential partnerships or strategic transactions at group level'. Moreover, these will only resume once the new board has been able to conduct a strategic review of the company.
The two accession investments that TDC still retains could be sold to free resources for use elsewhere although they do provide a significant proportion of its subscribers. Interestingly, Vodafone is already associated with both of these companies since it has a Network Partnership agreement with Bité in Lithuania and is a fellow shareholder in Polkomtel in Poland. Thus, one possible scenario would see TDC exit Lithuania and Poland through the sale of its stakes in Bité and Polkomtel to Vodafone. However, whether Vodafone would make such a purchase is dependent on its ability to convince its shareholders. The case for acquiring additional shares in Polkomtel is more compelling than that for acquiring Bité, primarily because Poland is a much bigger market with more growth potential than Lithuania, and whoever acquired Bité would anyway be likely to want to continue its Network Partnership agreement with Vodafone. Nevertheless, the stakes of Vodafone and TDC added together would still only amount to 39.2 per cent of Polkomtel, so Vodafone would presumably want to buy out sufficient other stakeholders at the same time to ensure majority ownership. As noted above, Deutsche Telekom, for one, expects Vodafone to strike in the reasonably near future, and it has to be Vodafone's likeliest next move within the accession countries. With the exception of the three Baltic States, TeliaSonera has no other mobile investments in accession countries. This should not be taken as suggesting that TeliaSonera has only a limited international presence outside of its two home markets - Table 8 below clearly demonstrates that this is not the case -but rather that its mobile investments are in a broad array of countries including some that may be among the next batch of accession countries. Telia and Sonera, prior to their merger, did take advantage of the 3G licensing process to enter Germany, Italy and Spain, three of the largest Western European markets. However, there has been a period of post-merger repentance involving the writing off of the investments in all three markets [7] .
Interestingly TeliaSonera now describes itself as 'the Nordic and Baltic telecommunications leader', but although this may simply be an appropriate description of its market position in these two regions, it does also raise the possibility that it will further reduce its international footprint. Without a 'local' partner to offset the risk inherent in investing in the next wave of accession countries, it is possible that TeliaSonera will sell more of its overseas investments, leaving it predominantly as a Nordic and Baltic operator. The April 2004 offer by TeliaSonera to take outright control of Eesti Telekom, although unsuccessful, together with the recent sales of stakes in Hong Kong and Namibia, reinforces the feeling that its strategic priorities lie in the Baltic and Nordic states and not elsewhere. Nevertheless, TeliaSonera will be debt-free by the end of 2004, and has a substantial war chest for acquisitions, so a contraction of its international footprint is not a foregone conclusion. Indeed, the Finnish government appears to have agreed to the merger on the understanding that TeliaSonera would pursue a strategy of growth. Ultimately, because it stated in June 2004 that its ambition is to take majority control of its foreign investments, and given the size of the proportionate subscribers involved, its strategy is dependent upon two factors. Firstly, there is the issue of its relationship with its main partners. For example, the relationship between TeliaSonera and Turkcell's largest shareholder, Çukurova, has at times been fraught and the situation in Russia is permanently unsettled. Such problems are usually addressed either via a takeover or a withdrawal. It is significant that, in late June 2004, the Finnish deputy CEO of TeliaSonera, with responsibility for pursuing the purchase of majority stakes in Turkcell and Megafon, was dismissed by the Swedish CEO [George, 2004] . At the very least, this indicates that TeliaSonera will not 'overpay' to take control, but to remain a permanent minority investor hardly seems an attractive proposition as TeliaSonera has acknowledged. The final company mentioned in Table 4 with a presence in the accession countries is Tele2. Although Tele2 operates in ten EU member states, it has made just three investments in the accession countries, namely Tele2 Eesti in Estonia, Tele2 Mobile in Latvia and UAB Tele2 in Lithuania. In other words, Tele2 has invested in the Baltic States that complement geographically its presence in the nearby Nordic States. Such a concentration of investment is clearly evident from the figure below. Figure 2 also draws attention to a second characteristic of Tele2's investment strategy; that is, its tendency to use MVNO arrangements to enter new markets. Of the nine mobile investments that Tele2 has made, almost half are as a MVNO. Those countries where Tele2 owns a network are shaded black on Figure 2 , while those where it has entered into a MVNO arrangement are shaded yellow. Of the five networks owned by Tele2, only one, Luxembourg, can be found outside of Sweden and the Baltic States. Thus, the geographical preference in terms of ownership, is marked as is the preference for control -only in Sweden, where it has an 87.3 per cent stake, does Tele2 not own the entire company. There has also been a temporal element to Tele2's strategy. Since 2000, the primary way through which Tele2 has entered new markets has been by setting up as a MVNO. Of the six EU member states that Tele2 has expanded into since 2000 only one, Luxembourg, has involved 2G network ownership, although given its small size, one of the main reasons for creating a MVNOcost -was not an issue here. It may also be noted that Tele2 acquired a 3G licence in Finland, although it has yet to launch the network, a factor necessitating the use of another operator's 2G network. Moreover, all of the mobile markets that Tele2 has entered since 2000 as a MVNO are EU15 member states and not accession countries. However, Tele2's strategy is a little more eclectic than it may appear to be on the basis of the above since it has recently acquired a regional 2G licence in Switzerland and has an ongoing operation in Russia although the number of mobile subscribers is modest.
When the geographical focus of Tele2 and its use of MVNOs are combined, we can conclude that while it may expand into new mobile markets in the future, these markets are more likely than not to be found among the EU15 member states than accession countries. As a consequence, Tele2 is unlikely to play anything other than a minor role in the mobile markets of accession countries outside of the Baltic States.
Conclusions
The above discussion has focused on the ownership of mobile communication licences in the enlarged EU. In the course of this a distinction has been made between the original 15 member states and the ten accession countries that joined in May 2004. The first conclusion that can be drawn is that the largest multiple owners of mobile communication licences identified by Whalley & Curwen (2003) have, with the exception of Vodafone, only a limited presence in the mobile communication markets of the ten accession countries. Both Tele2 and TeliaSonera have focused on the Baltic States while Deutsche Telekom has concentrated its attention on those Eastern European markets that either border, or are close to, its home market. This is not particularly surprising since liberalization offered so many opportunities to expand into the other member states of the preaccession EU, and the costs of licence acquisition plus network roll out were extremely burdensome. Hence, stake-building in the Baltic region or elsewhere in the former Eastern Europe was as likely to be influenced by political as much as economic considerations.
Once the date was pencilled in for accession there was the possibility of renewed strategic interest in the accession markets, but it came at a bad time since most operators were struggling with the fall-out from the collapse that began in 2002. Few accordingly had the wherewithal, let alone the will, to make expansionary moves. The obvious candidate was Vodafone, given its resources and its strategy based upon its international footprint, while an alternative contender such as Orange was forced to retrench to the point that it became, to all intents and purpose, a Western European-focused mobile operator with a presence in an increasingly scattered set of markets. While the need to raise capital for its parent company has abated, Orange, like TeliaSonera, is no longer interested in playing bit parts and wants to be a serious player or to exit. Exit is nevertheless easier said than done because of the shortage of buyers, and even the likes of Vodafone would be hard pressed to pay the kind of premium that Orange (or other potential sellers) would demand in the present investment climate. Insofar as stake-building is concerned, it does appear to be far more likely that operators will seek to consolidate their positions in existing markets through purchasing additional equity in companies where they already own a stake, but since these are short in supply and would unquestionably require a considerable control premium to be paid, we can reasonably conclude that very few of the accession countries will witness ownership changes over the course of the next year or two.
In this respect it is significant that, although Vodafone is present in seven accession countries, it does not own a network in all seven markets. Indeed, Vodafone owns a network in just two markets -Malta and Poland -and is present in the other five through the use of Network Partnership agreements. Those markets where Vodafone has used Network Partnership agreements are characterised by their small size. When this observation is combined with the propensity of Tele2 to use MVNO arrangements to enter markets, a final conclusion is that multiple licence owners are using a wider variety of entry modes than was previously the case. However, a final caveat is that while Vodafone has opted to establish Network Partnership agreements in preference to the purchase of a network in small markets, Tele2 has made MVNO arrangements in both small and large markets alike.
Notes

1
For a discussion of the challenges of EU enlargement see, for example, Cottrell (2003) In practice, one of the licences was withheld for reasons of non-payment in Slovakia, one revoked in Portugal and one returned to the regulator in Germany. To make matters even muddier, one licence was sold on in Sweden but the sale fell foul of the regulator and one licence in Germany is in abeyance and will probably be revoked. 5
Total number of subscribers multiplied by ownership stake. 6
The remaining shares, approximately 8.4% of the company, will be purchased by TDC itself at a later date. 7
Sonera wrote down the value of its investments in Group 3G and Ipse 2000 to zero at a total cost of SEK39.2bn in the second quarter of 2002 (TeliaSonera, 2003, p.53) . This was followed in December 2002 by a SEK660m write-down on the value of its stake in Xfera, its Spanish 3G investment.
